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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MARIE PENROD 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
DALE PENROD 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 940383-CA 
Priority No. 2 
The Defendant submits the following reply brief in 
accordance with the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court should award alimony only after considering 
the financial condition and need of the receiving spouse, the 
ability of the receiving spouse to provide for herself and the 
ability of the payor spouse to provide support. Any such 
finding of the trial court should be based upon evidence adduced 
in the case with sufficient clarity to allow the litigants and 
this Court to review the same. In this case, the trial court's 
findings with regard to the amount of money earned by the 
Plaintiff are erroneous and contradicted by the earning records 
of the parties. The trial court's findings with regard to the 
Defendants's ability to pay are totally unsubstantiated by the 
record. The testimony and historical earnings of the parties 
establishes that the income of the Plaintiff far exceeds that of 
the Defendant. Accordingly, the award of alimony in this case 
should be set aside. 
The trial court increased the alimony award based upon the 
Plaintiff's voluntary contribution to an adult child on a church 
mission. The court did so without any finding of necessity or 
special circumstance. Because the trial court failed to make 
findings pursuant to the child support statutes and because the 
voluntary contribution has nothing to do with the Plaintiff 
becoming a public charge or her standard of living, the findings 
relating to the increased alimony and need of the Plaintiff 
should be set aside. 
The Findings of Fact requiring the Defendant to maintain a 
life insurance policy in the face amount of $100,000.00 are 
improper for two reasons. First, counsel for the Plaintiff 
failed to include the trial court's ruling that the face amount 
of the policy was to reflect only the present value of the 
Plaintiff's alimony award. Secondly, inasmuch as the Plaintiff 
was awarded alimony, this provision meant to insure the award, 
should be stricken. 
The court's finding with regard to the one-acre parcel was 
erroneous. The one-acre parcel was given to the Defendant by his 
father as a gift. The Plaintiff's name was added to the deed 
only to facilitate financing. Inasmuch as the Plaintiff did not 
enhance the value of the lot and inasmuch as the identity of the 
lot was lost through commingling or exchange, the value of the 
lot should have been awarded to the Defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN AWARDING 
ALIMONY TO THE PLAINTIFF 
A. Standard of Appellate Review. 
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The Plaintiff has misstated the appellate standard of review 
regarding alimony awards. There is no question that the trial 
court is endowed with considerable discretion in awarding 
alimony and that the award will not be over-turned unless there 
has been a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion. Bingham v. 
Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065 (Utah App. 1994); Paffell v. Paffell, 732 
P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986). 
However, in ruling on the adequacy of the trial court's 
findings, the test is as follows: 
Where a trial court has considered these three factors 
[(1) financial conditions and needs of the receiving 
spouse; (2) ability of receiving spouse to provide 
for herself; and, (3) the ability of the payor to 
provide support] and has supported its rulings with 
adequate findings based on sufficient evidence, we 
will not disturb its determination unless it has 
clearly abused its discretion. Willey v. Willey, 
866 P.2d 547, 550 (Utah App. 1993); Chambers v. 
Chambers, 840 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah App. 1992). 
"Findings are adequate only if they are 'sufficiently 
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to 
disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion 
on each factual issue was reached.'" Hall v. Hall, 
858 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting 
Allred v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah App. 
1990)). (Emphasis added). 
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See Cox v. Cox, 877 P.2d 1262 (Utah App. 1994). 
There is no question that findings of fact that are without 
adequately evidentiary foundation must be set aside. Interior 
Contracting, Inc. v. Smith, 247 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (Utah App. 
1994); Western Capital & Sacs., Inc. v. Kanudsvig, 768 P.2d 989, 
991 (Utah App. 1989). 
B. Criteria for the Award of Alimony. 
The parties agree that the general purpose of alimony is to 
prevent the receiving spouse from becoming a public charge and to 
maintain to the extent possible the standard of living enjoyed 
during the marriage. Appellee's Brief at 6; Schaumberg v. 
Schaumberg, 240 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (1994); Rosendahl v. Rosendahl, 
240 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (1994); Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 
1212 (Utah App. 1991). 
In determining to award alimony and in setting the amount, 
the trial court must consider (1) the financial conditions and 
needs of the receiving spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving 
spouse to provide for him or herself; and (3) the ability of the 
payor or spouse to provide support. Chambers v. Chambers, 840 
P.2d 841, 843 (Utah App. 1992); Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 
84 (Utah App. 1989). 
C. The Trial Court's Findings with Regard to the Financial 
Conditions and Needs of the Plaintiff and Ability 
of the Defendant to Pay Alimony are Inadequate. 
The relevant sections of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Decree that relate to alimony are paragraphs 5 and 15 
of the Findings which are mirrored in paragraph 2 of the 
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Conclusions and paragraph 2 of the Decree. Findings numbered 5 
and 15 are as follows: 
5. The Court finds that the Plaintiff's monthly 
income is $1,779.00 and imputes to the Defendant 
monthly income in the sum of $2,383.00. Defendant's 
income is calculated based upon the testimony given at 
trial by the Defendant which showed that he worked 
twenty (20) hours per week, that sixty percent (60%) of 
his employment was billed at the rate of $65.00/hour 
and forty percent (40%) of his employment billed at the 
rate of $40.00/hour, that he worked nine (9) months 
during the year and that one-third (1/3) of his gross 
income was attributable to expenses and therefore that 
his yearly income amounted to $28,600.00 or $2,383.00 
per month. The Court further finds that Defendant 
earns $7,732.00 more than Plaintiff each year. 
15. The Court finds that Plaintiff and Defendant 
were married for over twenty-seven (27) years and that 
Plaintiff is in need of alimony and that Defendant 
should pay to Plaintiff as alimony the sum of 
$672.00/month said alimony to be permanent. This 
finding is based upon the additional expenses which 
Plaintiff presently incurs as reflected on her 
Financial Declaration and which she anticipates will be 
reduced after ten (10) months and upon the Defendant's 
minimal expenses and his ability to pay. 
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There is no question that the court had a proper evidentiary 
basis to determine that the Plaintiff's gross monthly income was 
$1,731.00 and that her net monthly income was $1,230.00 (R. 61). 
The figures outlined above came from the Plaintifffs financial 
declaration introduced at trial (R. 61). This Court should be 
aware however that the Plaintiff on cross-examination conceded 
that she had worked over the past ten years and had made 
$19,851.29 ($1,654.27 per month) in 1986 which had grown by 1992 
to $26,188.41 ($2,182.37 per month) (Defendant's Exhibit No. 12; 
R. 103 at 47, 48). 
There is no question that the Plaintiff testified that her 
monthly expenses were $2,494.00 of which $350.00 per month was 
spent on a voluntary contribution to her adult son that was on a 
mission for his church (R. 58; 103 at 39-41). 
Aside from the $350.00 voluntary contribution, the monthly 
needs were established by her testimony. The evidence therefor 
showed that the Plaintiff had between $1,739.00 and $2,182.37 per 
month in gross income. The evidence establish that her monthly 
needs were $2,994.00 minus the $350.00 voluntary contribution or 
$2,144.00. 
The major error committed by the trial court related to its 
findings of the Defendant's ability to pay. In her brief, the 
Plaintiff simply recites pages out of the transcript and makes 
generalizations (Appellee's Brief 11-13). 
The parties both signed income tax returns from 1986 to 1992 
which revealed the following income for the parties: 
6 
Year Plaintiff Defendant 
1992 $26,188.41 $ 2,890.00 
1991 $23,650.10 $ 7,231.00 
1990 $21,358.22 $ 6,387.00 
1989 $22,854.73 $14,562.00 
1988 $19,573.81 $17,295.00 
1987 $19,071.95 $13,724.00 
1986 $19,851.29 $19,530.00 
Defendant's Exhibit Nos. 12 and 13; R. 103 at 49-53, 74-79. 
The Appellee does not dispute the record of earnings established 
by the tax returns (Appellee's Brief at 7-13). 
Most importantly, the Plaintiff continues to misconstrue the 
record with regard to the Defendant's testimony of the amount of 
time that he worked. Finding of Fact No. 5, in which the trial 
court attributes $2,283.00 to the Defendant is without any basis: 
Defendant's income is calculated based upon the 
testimony given at trial by the Defendant which showed 
that he worked twenty (20) hours per week, that sixty 
percent (60%) of his employment was billed at the rate 
of $65.00/hour and forty percent (40%) of his 
employment billed at the rate of $40.00/hour, that he 
worked nine (9) months during the year and that one-
third (1/3) of his gross income was attributable to 
expenses and therefore that his yearly income amounted 
to $28,600.00 or $2,383.00 per month. The Court 
further finds that Defendant earns $7,732.00 more than 
Plaintiff each year. 
R. 85. 
The Defendant testified that to the time of trial, his net 
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income for five and a half months was $6,002.62 or $1,091.38 per 
month (R. Defendant's Exhibit Nos. 12, 13 and 15; R. 103 at 49-
43, 74-79). 
The findings of the trial court came from the cross-
examination of the Defendant in which he testified: 
A. He had worked for five hours the day before the 
trial (R. 103 at 94); 
B. That he billed $65.00 per hour for the cat and 
tried to charge $35.00 to $40.00 per hour for the 
truck (R. 103 at 100); 
C. When asked if he could estimate the percentage 
of time he worked at $65.00 per hour versus $35.00 
to $40.00 per hour, the Defendant testified that 
he worked a little over half to two-thirds with the 
cat and the other with the truck (R. 103 at 100-101); 
D. When asked to give an average of the number of 
hours the Defendant worked a week, the Defendant 
testified that he could not. He stated that some 
weeks he worked and some weeks he didn't (R. 103 at 
102); 
E. Only when counsel for the Plaintiff asked the 
Defendant the number of hours he worked the previous 
week, was the Defendant able to answer that he 
worked approximately 20 hours (R. 102 at 103). 
It is apparently from that testimony that the court 
extrapolated the ability of the Defendant to work 20 hours every 
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week of the year. As clearly set forth in the transcript, the 
Defendant testified that he had worked only 20 hours the week 
before the trial which occurred in the month of July, 1993. 
There is no testimony in the record to establish that the 
Defendant could work 20 hours every week of the year. In fact 
the Plaintiff herself testified that the Defendant's work was 
confined to Spring and Summer (R. 103 at 9-10). 
Accordingly, there is no evidence in the record to establish 
any income on the part of the Defendant other than the average of 
$1,091.38 for the five and a half months before the trial and the 
amounts of income indicated on the tax returns. 
The Appellee's brief also improperly uses the term "imputed 
income." (Appellee's Brief at 7). The trial court did not 
impute income to the Defendant. The court was attempting to 
determine the wages actually made by the Defendant. The findings 
of the trial court are completely inadequate to support a finding 
of imputed income. As this Court has explained: 
"Imputing income to an unemployed or underemployed 
spouse when setting an alimony award is conceptually 
appropriate as part of the determination of that 
spouses's ability to produce a sufficient income." 
Willey, 866 P.2d at 554. However, a court should not 
impute income for child or spousel support until it 
first determines, "as a threshold matter, that income 
should be imputed because the [spouse] is voluntarily 
unemployed or underemployed." Hall, 858 P.2d at 1024. 
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Cox v. Cox, 877 P.2d 1262, 1254 (Utah App. 1994). 
The findings of the trial court do not even attempt to 
establish that the Defendant was voluntarily underemployed or 
unemployed and therefore the findings of income must be 
supported by evidence. 
In summary, the evidence does not support the court's 
findings with regard to the ability of the Defendant to earn. 
The evidence in the case established that historically the 
Defendant has made a small percentage of the income generated by 
the Plaintiff. Inasmuch as the findings are clearly 
insupportable, they must be set aside. 
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN FINDING THAT 
VOLUNTARILY CONTRIBUTIONS TO AN ADULT CHILD 
CONSTITUTED A LEGITIMATE LIVING EXPENSE OF 
THE PLAINTIFF 
The trial court ordered the Defendant to pay an increased 
alimony award for ten months of $672.00 per month which then was 
reduced to $322.00 per month which was to be permanent alimony. 
The court made that award based upon the Plaintiff's voluntary 
contribution of $350.00 to an adult child on a church mission (R. 
103 at 146-148). 
The Defendant contends that the court was compelling the 
Defendant to pay child support through the Plaintiff to an adult 
child. As outlined in the Appellant's original brief, the trial 
court may order support of a child to age 21 but may do so only 
upon a finding of "necessity" and "special or unusual 
circumstances." Utah Code Annotated 15-2-1 (1953 as Amended); 
Balls v. Hackele, 745 P.2d 836 (Utah App. 1987); Jackman v. 
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Jackman, 696 P.2d 1191 (Utah 1985); Thornblad v. Thornblad, 849 
P.2d 1197 (Utah App. 1994). 
In response, the Plaintiff does not dispute that the $350.00 
represents a voluntary contribution to an adult child an a 
church mission (Appellee's Brief at 12). The Plaintiff contends 
that because the Plaintiff had been incurring the expense prior 
to the divorce, it was fairly considered as part of the 
Plaintiff's needs and expenses during the marriage (Appellee's 
Brief at 12-13). 
First, voluntary contributions to any third party can not be 
considered as a need or expense of the receiving spouse. As 
acknowledged by both parties, the general purpose of alimony is 
to prevent the receiving spouse from becoming a public charge and 
to maintain to the extent possible the standard of living 
enjoyed during the marriage. Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 
1212 (Utah App. 1991). The voluntary contribution to an adult 
child has nothing to do with keeping the Plaintiff from becoming 
a public charge and has no correlation to the Plaintiff's 
standard of living. 
The impropriety of the court's ruling is two-fold. First, 
the trial court was attempting to compel the Defendant to pay 
child support for an adult child without making any finding of 
necessity and using an award of alimony simply as a guise. 
Secondly, the order is an unjustified personal affront to the 
Defendant. The court required the Defendant to pay by way of 
alimony every dime that the parties had contributed to the 
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missionary son* By increasing the alimony award $350.00, the 
Defendant was responsible for all of the contribution to the 
missionary which is totally unjustified based upon the relative 
earning ability of the parties. Additionally, the court order 
usurped the right of the Defendant to provide voluntarily for his 
adult son. 
Because the order of the trial court is violative of the 
rules and case law regarding child support and because the 
voluntary contribution has nothing to do with becoming a public 
charge or standard of living, the order of increased alimony for 
ten months must be set aside. 
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
REQUIRING THE DEFENDANT TO MAINTAIN A $100,000 LIFE 
INSURANCE POLICY 
The trial court ordered the Defendant to maintain the 
$100,000.00 life insurance policy for the benefit of the 
Plaintiff in order to protect the Plaintiff's alimony award 
should the Defendant die. In fact, the court stated: 
MR. PETRO: So what's the holding then with 
regard to life insurance? 
THE COURT: That up to the $100,000.00 amount be 
maintained to protect Mrs. Penrod's interest in alimony 
for the rest of her life, $322.00 a month. If the 
present value of that is less than $100,000.00, I'll 
simply require him to maintain a sufficient amount to 
make sure that should something happen to Mr. Penrod, 
that she still receives the $322.00 a month. 
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R. 103 at 149. 
As outlined in the original brief, the Defendant has two 
objections. First, inasmuch as the life insurance was meant to 
protect the Plaintiff's alimony award, the ruling of this Court 
with regard to the abatement of alimony should also abate any 
requirement for life insurance. 
Secondly, Judge Burningham explicitly ordered the amount of 
insurance required only to reflect the value of the monthly 
alimony award over Mrs. Penrod's expected life. Paragraph 16 of 
the Findings of Fact prepared by Plaintiff's counsel totally 
omits Judge Burningham's ruling that the face amount of the 
policy only had to reflect the present value of the alimony 
award, which is obviously is significantly less than $100,000.00. 
The response of the Plaintiff totally misses the issues 
raised by the Defendant (Appellee's Brief at 13-15). The 
Plaintiff does not dispute that the life insurance order was to 
insure the Plaintiff's alimony award and does not dispute that 
Judge Burningham ordered that the face amount of the policy only 
reflect the present value of the life insurance. 
Accordingly, the order relating to life insurance, as with 
the alimony award, should be abated. In any regard, the 
findings should be amended to reflect Judge Burningham's ruling 
that the life insurance only represent the present value of the 
alimony award. 
POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
FAILING TO COMPENSATE THE DEFENDANT FOR THE ONE-ACRE 
PARCEL RECEIVED AS PART OF HIS INHERITANCE 
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There is very little dispute in the evidence relating to the 
one-acre parcel on which the family home was built. There is no 
question that the one-acre parcel was deeded to the parties by 
the Defendant's father, Leroy W. Penrod. The transfer of the 
deed was a gift inasmuch as the parties gave no consideration for 
the land. 
Likewise, there is no question that the conveyance of the 
land was made to allow the parties to build a home. Although the 
Plaintiff testified that she thought the piece of property was 
given to both the Plaintiff and Defendant, she did not have any 
conversation with the Defendant's father upon which that 
assumption could be made. The Defendant testified that the one-
acre parcel, as with the other land, was given to him by his 
father. The Defendant testified that the only reason the 
Plaintiff's name was placed on the deed was to facilitate 
financing on the home. The value of the lot at the time the 
Defendant received it from his father was $15,000.00 and at the 
time of trial was $35,000.00. 
The Plaintiff, in her response, does not refute the case law 
cited by the Appellant. The Court in Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 
P. 2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988), held that property acquired by one 
spouse through gift or inheritance during the marriage should be 
awarded to that spouse together with any appreciation of its 
value. The only exception relates to when the other spouse 
contributes to the enhancement of the property or the property 
has lost its identity through commingling or exchange. 
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In this case, the lot was given to the Defendant by his 
father as a gift. The Plaintiff's testimony that she thought the 
property was given to her also is without any foundation. The 
Plaintiff had not been told by either the Defendant or the 
Defendant's father that the gift of the property was to include 
her. On the other hand, the Defendant testified that his father 
gifted the property to him on only put the Plaintiff's name on 
the deed to facilitate financing. The Plaintiff did not enhance 
the value of the lot by her efforts and the identity of the 
property was not lost through commingling or exchange. 
Accordingly, the value of the one-acre parcel should be 
awarded to the Defendant based upon the clear evidence in the 
case. 
CONCLUSION 
Although there is some evidence to support the Plaintiff's 
expenses and income as found by the trial court, there is no 
evidence to support the trial court's findings as it relates to 
the Defendant's income and ability to pay. The historical 
earnings of the parties as established by their tax returns 
demonstrates that the Plaintiff's income has far exceeded that of 
the Defendant. Accordingly, the order requiring the Defendant to 
pay alimony should be set aside. 
The trial court's finding that the Defendant should pay an 
additional $350.00 in alimony to offset the Plaintiff's 
voluntary contribution to an adult child is violative of child 
support guidelines and totally inappropriate. 
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The Findings of Fact that relate to the $100,000.00 life 
insurance policy should be amended to include the trial court's 
instruction that the value of the policy should not exceed the 
present value of the Plaintiff's alimony award. Inasmuch as the 
findings justifying the award of alimony are insufficient, the 
provision relating to life insurance should likewise be stricken. 
Lastly, the court errored in failing to award the value of 
the one-acre parcel to the Defendant as a gift from his father. 
DATED this l ° day of January, 1995. 
Michael J. Petro, Esq. 
Attorney for Appellant 
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